The Misty Grail: The Search for a Comprehensive Measure of Development and the Reasons of GDP Primacy by Felice, Emanuele
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Misty Grail: The Search for a
Comprehensive Measure of Development
and the Reasons of GDP Primacy
Emanuele Felice
Universitat Auto`noma de Barcelona
3. January 2015
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/61095/
MPRA Paper No. 61095, posted 3. January 2015 22:58 UTC
 1 
 
Emanuele Felice 
Autonomous University of Barcelona 
 
 
THE MISTY GRAIL: THE SEARCH FOR A COMPREHENSIVE MEASURE OF DEVELOP-
MENT AND THE REASONS FOR GDP PRIMACY 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The last decades have seen a flourishing of new indicators to measure economic progress, but 
none of them has succeded in replacing GDP. Why? The article reviews what are arguably the three 
most successful alternatives to GDP (the Human Development Index, the Genuine Progress Indica-
tor, and the Happy Planet Index), by focusing on their conceptual foundations (the capability ap-
proach, utilitarism, the wealth approach, or a mix of these) − rather than on statistical solidity or 
mathematical refinement as most of the literature does. After discussing their faults, it is shown that 
the wealth approach underlying GDP can be easily extended to include environmental and well-
being components (non-market wealth measured at market prices), and to substantiate this claim es-
timates of environment-augmented  GDP for 130 countries are presented and discussed. However, 
up to the present not even this line of research has been successful. This suggests that among the 
reasons behind GDP primacy there is not only philosophical consistency or statistical soundness, 
but also social suitability, being the standard GDP more suitable to reflect the goals of capitalist-
market economies. Constructing composite indicators alternative to GDP is trivial, until when the 
current preference system has not been changed. To achieve this change, a dashboard approach may 
be preferable to composite indicators, since the former provides the different social groups with in-
telligible quantitative instruments. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
To this day, the literature about GDP and its limits has grown huge, with some resonance also 
with policy-making (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2009). Many alternative measures have been pro-
posed and, although some of them – namely the Human Development Index (HDI), but also the 
Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) and the Happy Planet Index (HPI) – have attained renown, at the 
present none has succeeded in replacing the long-standing primacy of GDP per capita. While it is 
widely acknowledged that GDP fails to properly track crucial dimensions of development, from en-
vironmental to social goals, there is acceptance that, at least, for GDP the choice of components se-
ries and their aggregation function are constrained by a consistent economic theory. This is not the 
case for alternative composite indicators, which not by chance have even been dubbed, by their crit-
ics, «mashup indices» (Ravallion, 2012a). But the advocates of composite indicators have not been 
discouraged by disapproval; on the contrary, they have gone on with developing a highly refined 
body of computational techniques, including pre-computation multivariate and post-computation 
sensitive analyses, in order to make multi-criteria evaluation flexible enough to adapt to different 
social environments and policy goals.1 And yet the big questions still loom. What is the use of 
highly elaborate composite indicators for policy-makers and for the society? Does their increasing 
complexity go to the detriment of their clarity? If this is the case, should we consider the search for 
a comprehensive measure of development − an indicator which would be, at the same time, more 
inclusive than GDP, theoretically consistent, and comparable across periods and countries − as a 
sort of «misty» grail, i.e. as an unattainable goal which in the end confounds the researcher? And as 
a consequence, wouldn’t the alternative dashboard (of multiple indices) approach, which monitors 
each component separately, be preferable?2  
In order to properly address these questions, two important steps have not been taken yet. First, 
we should understand why thus far the most popular alternative composite indices have failed to re-
place GDP; second, from the previous mistakes we should draw lessons on how to replace or even 
only to improve GDP. But in doing so, we should remind that the advantages of composite indica-
tors versus simple ones (and versus a dashboard approach) should not be considered only in abstract 
terms, but primarily with reference to the social actors who from them derive policy guidance: to 
                                                 
1
 A useful introduction can bee OECD/JCR (2008) and Munda (2012). See also: Munda and Nardo (2009) for mathematical model-
ling; Munda (2004) for the importance of the social, political and technical structuring process in the computation scheme and the 
argument of context-dependant weights, which should be intended as importance coefficients and not as trade-off; Munda (2005) for 
the development of a multi-criterion framework to measure sustainability.  
2
 A similar cas is mad by Ravallion (2011) with reference to poverty monitoring. 
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believe that economics is an abstract science, whose postulates and results can be superimposed 
upon the actual structure of a given society, is only illusory. 
The article aims to contribute to both these open issues. Its starting point is that the failure of the 
main alternative indices is due, by first instance, to the weakness of their conceptual foundations. 
All of these indices are composite indicators which weight up different “dimensions” according to 
some criterion: as we are going to see, the aggregation function and/or the single dimensions are ei-
ther faulty (Genuine Progress Indicator, Happy Planet Index), or incoherent with the declared goals 
of the index (Human Development Index). Up to the present, most of the criticisms have concen-
trated on the statistical consistency and calibration of the indices, or on the accuracy and value of 
their single dimensions, whereas their conceptual foundations have been relatively overlooked.3 The 
result was that some of the new “improved” indices proposed, although mathematically increasingly 
more refined, were even less conceptually consistent, with paradoxical consequences in terms of 
policy indications (Ravallion, 2012b). On this, the case of HDI is emblematic, as I will briefly illus-
trate in paragraph §2; although less popular, GPI and HPI share the same flaws (§3).  
The conceptual foundations of GDP are essentially the “wealth” or “income” approach, where 
wealth is intended in a very strict sense (monetary wealth). The alternative indices are based either 
on the capabilities approach (the HDI), or on a sort of unclear (and highly subjective) combination 
of utilitarian and wealth theories (GPI, HPI). I argue that, among those proposed, the wealth ap-
proach is the best capable of being converted into an index, i.e. of measuring development: wealth – 
or its periodical flow, income – is an “objective” quantity with can be measured with a reasonable 
degree of accuracy, unlike capabilities or utilities. I also argue that it can be extended to include 
non-market components reflecting well-being and environment, following a literature dating back to 
the  1970s and 1980s. Thus, it would be possible to have indices of economic progress conceptually 
consistent and, at the same time, more inclusive than GDP. However, up to the present neither these 
alternatives have been successful. These considerations suggest that philosophical consistency is 
only an apparent reason behind GDP enduring primacy, and probably not even the most important 
one. The higher “social suitability” of GDP could be at least as important: we should not forget that 
to maximize monetary wealth (via producing good and services to be sold in the market) is the pre-
vailing goal of the current capitalist-market economies (e.g. Hamilton, 2003). Therefore, even 
though the wealth approach can be extended to include some social and ecological dimensions, 
without losing the basics of its “objectivity” (§4), it is unlikely that some improved GDP or GDP 
will succeed, until when the prevailing goals of a society will not be modified to include dimensions 
which are not currently exchanged in the market. Meantime, the society is a complex living fabric, 
                                                 
3
 In OECD/JCR (2008) out of 158 pages only one (p. 22) is dedicated to warn against possible inconsistencies in the theoretical 
framework. Less concise is the discussion in Ravallion (2012a, pp. 6–8). 
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an open field where different actors struggle to affirm their views and interests: in a confrontation 
like this, a dashboard approach, which endows each social group with its own evaluation instru-
ments, has advantages over composite indicators, where preferences and thus trade-offs are hidden 
and ultimately confused, and confusion for what concerns policy goals tends to follow from their 
weak conceptual foundations. 
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2. FROM CAPABILITIES TO THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX. A BRIEF RE-
VIEW OF A FAILURE 
 
 
The Human Development Index (HDI) was introduced in 1990 by the United Nations Devel-
opment Program (UNDP, 1990), in its first annual Human Development Report (HDR): through the 
years, HDI gained vast popularity, so much so that it is now the most established alternative to 
GDP. Its conceptual foundation must be found in the Sen’s capabilities approach to welfare eco-
nomics (Sen, 1985). Functional capabilities are substantive freedoms people have reason to value: 
for instance, the ability to live a long and healthy life, «longevity»; the ability to decide about one 
own future, assured by an adequate «education»; the ability to engage in economic transactions and 
to satisfy material needs, «resources». Accordingly, poverty must be understood as capability-
deprivation. Thus illiteracy, ill health, lack of access to resources, must be considered as obstacles 
to what an individual can do in her/his life: human development consists in removing these obsta-
cles (Sen and Anand, 1990). 
Initially, Sen was sceptical about the idea and the possibility of synthesizing the complexity of 
the human capabilities approach into one single index. Nonetheless, Pakistani economist Mahbub ul 
Haq, in Sen’s words “the originator of the Human Development Report”, succeeded in persuading 
him that a single indicator was necessary as a means to policy makers alternative to GDP: it would 
shift the attention of policy makers, and hopefully of the larger public opinion, from maximizing in-
come to maximizing welfare, i.e. from national income accounting to people-centred policies.4 In 
other words, HDI was devised for practical purpose: although it got some success as an alternative 
to GDP, as mentioned, it failed as an instrument for policy makers, as we are going to see. Through 
the years, further refinements drifted it further away from the original capability approach.   
The three basic components of human life were recognized to be longevity, education, and re-
sources. Consistently with the capability approach, these were computed in terms of deprivation, 
according to the formula: 
 
                                                 
4
 In Sen’s words: “Indeed, I must admit I did not initially see much merit in the HDI itself, which, as it happens, I was privileged to 
help devise. At first I had expressed to Mahbub ul Haq […] considerable scepticism about trying to focus on a crude index of this 
kind, attempting to catch in one simple number a complex reality about human development and deprivation”. Sen also refers Ma-
hbub’s reply: “We need a measure […] of the same level of vulgarity as GNP – just one number – but a measure that is not as blind 
to social aspects of human life as GNP is” (UNDP, 1999, p. 23, also for the quotation about Mahbub ul Haq; see also Haq, 1995). 
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where Iij is the deprivation indicator for the jth country with respect to the ith variable. The three 
basic variables were Life expectancy (X1) for longevity, adult literacy rate (X2) for education, and 
the ln of real per capita GDP (X3) for resources, whereas maximum and minimum values were de-
termined from the actual values of the current sample.5 The average deprivation indicator was thus 
determined as the arithmetic mean of the three deprivation indicators: 
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from which HDI was 1 minus the average deprivation index: 
 
(3) ( ) ( )IHDI jj −= 1  
 
(UNDP, 1990, p. 109). This measure was straightforward, but appealing. The only serious arbitrari-
ness was the use of a log transformation for resources: it was derived from the reasonable premise 
of diminishing returns from income to human development, and calculated following the well-
known Atkinson formulation for the utility of income (Atkinson, 1979), in the presence of dimin-
ishing returns (UNDP, 1992, p. 91).  
As early as with the second HDR, however, the formula for the education (knowledge) compo-
nent had changed into an average of two-thirds literacy and one-third mean years of schooling 
(UNDP, 1991, pp. 88-89). Now, both the weights and the new indicator (mean years of schooling) 
looked somehow arbitrary. For what concerns mean years of schooling, it was unclear why every 
year of schooling was counted equal, in each country and also between countries (regardless of 
cross-country differences in school systems), and, above all, why for each year of schooling and 
each country the same relationship was supposed to be between years of schooling and the capabil-
ity of deciding about one own future (i.e., why quantitative differences in the years of schooling, 
above the literacy threshold, should proxy the capability of deciding about one own future). Up to 
the present, these questions are still unanswered. 
                                                 
5
 In 1990: 78.4 and 41.8 for life expectancy; 100.0 and 12.3 for adult literacy rate; 3.68 and 2.34 for real GDP per capita (log).   
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The next step was to move from empirical to theoretical thresholds, which from 1994 onwards 
were somehow arbitrarily decided for life expectancy (85.0 and 25.0 years), income (PPP $40,000 
and $200), and mean years of schooling (15 and 0 years); only adult literacy was left unchanged, 
ranging from 0% to 100%  (UNDP, 1994, p. 108). Then, by 1995, mean years of schooling (a stock 
measure just like adult literacy ratio) were substituted by combined primary, secondary and tertiary 
enrolment ratios (a flow measure), ranging from 0% to 100%  (UNDP, 1995, p. 134). This was one 
more step away from the capability approach, which further increased the arbitrariness of the educa-
tion component, not least because enrolment ratios are flow measures referring to only a part of the 
population (unlike literacy and mean years of schooling, which are stock measures referring to the 
whole population). What is worse, in the 1995 HDR there is no justification at all for this change.  
Together with great interest,6 since its introduction HDI also received widespread criticisms, 
from McGillivray (1991) onwards. Broadly speaking, these criticisms can be catalogued into three 
categories, not necessarily mutually exclusive: a) those who rejected some or all of the components 
of the HDI (and the related conceptual framework) and, in some cases, proposed new and alterna-
tive indices, such as the Genuine Progress Indicator (Cobb and Cobb Jr., 1994) and similar; b) those 
who accepted the basic components of the HDI and its conceptual foundations, but added new di-
mensions, such as political freedom, inequality, pollution; c) those who concentrated on the way the 
three components were measured and computed. In just a handful of years, the bibliography grew 
considerably, so much so that we must limit ourselves to the most relevant contributions. While 
point a) will be developed in the next paragraph, we now focus on the criticisms falling under points 
b) and c).  
For what concerns point b), further developments have considerably extended the number of ba-
sic capabilities, with the decisive contribution by Amartya Sen and Sudhir Anand – on sustainabil-
ity and environment (Sen and Anand 1994a, 1994b), gender equality (Sen and Anand, 1995), hu-
man poverty (Sen and Anand, 1997), human rights (Sen and Anand, 2000) – as well as by Martha 
Nussbaum (2000), who has raised the number of basic capabilities up to ten dimensions.7 As a con-
sequence, over the years the HDRs have been enriching by incorporating new indicators, such as 
those on gender equality or human poverty (for a synthesis, see Fukuda-Parr, 2003, p. 303). How-
ever, these indicators were computed and discussed as qualifications to the HDI, whose basic com-
position was not changed, at least in the HDRs. As a consequence, a sort of hierarchies among hu-
man capabilities was created which, once again, had no theoretical foundations: why were some ca-
pabilities (longevity, knowledge, resources) computed in a synthetic index, with trade-off implica-
                                                 
6
 For example, among economic historians: see Crafts (1997, 2002) for cross-country comparisons, and Felice and Vasta (2012) for 
(Italian) regional ones. 
7
 These are: 1) life, 2) bodily health, 3) bodily integrity, 4) sense, imagination, and thought, 5) emotion, 6) practical reason, 7) affilia-
tion, 8) other species, 9) play, 10) control over one’s environment (Nussbaum, 2000).  
 8 
tions to the policy maker, while others were treated separately? Up to the present, also this question 
remains unanswered in the HDRs. On the other hand, many authors have proposed new indices in-
corporating new or different capabilities: the literature grew as a forest around a tree, and yet still 
without incorporating the total range of capabilities as developed by Nussbaum, and often with re-
markably fragile theoretical and mathematical foundations. The factory of (redundant) composite 
indicators has been running into high gear, with alleged but indeed more and more feeble links with 
the capability approach.  
Concerning point c), different “improved” HDI have been proposed, aiming to overcome some 
shortcomings of the previous formulas. Following Kakwani (1993), Leandro Prados (2010) has re-
cently presented an «improved» HDI, along with historical estimates for the world and its main re-
gions covering the period spanning the late XIX century until our days. The main novelties are the 
use of a convex achievement function for the social components (longevity and education), which 
assigns higher values (higher achievement) to improvement at the higher levels, and the use of a 
geometric average, rather than an arithmetic one, in order to reduce substitutability among the index 
components (i.e., the index performs better when all the three components perform better, and a de-
crease in one component is hardly compensated by an increase in another).8 However, not all agreed 
with these changes, quite the contrary. For example, some authors (Tsui, 1996) have challenged the 
assumption of a convex achievement function (and thus of increasing returns) for the social compo-
nents; others (Noorbakhsh, 1998) have even proposed to extend to education the assumption of di-
minishing returns.  
Although at the present the literature is inconclusive, in their latest human development report 
(UNDP, 2010) the United Nations have accepted some of the above criticisms and made a consider-
able effort to improve their measure. The three HDI components are now measured as follows: 
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For longevity (X1), which is still measured through the Life expectancy index (LeI), the mini-
mum threshold is theoretical (20 years), while the maximum (83.2) is empirical (the maximum 
value observed in the sample, Japan in 2010). Education (X2) is measured through an Education in-
                                                 
8
 In Prados’ words: “The final outcome is a new human development index which, by not concealing the gap between rich and poor 
countries, casts a much less optimistic view than the one provided by conventional UNDP index while satisfying the HDR concern 
for international differences” (Prados, 2010, p. 842). The author also introduced some minor changes in the maximum and minimum 
thresholds, because in his wide historical and geographical range of observations the UNDP maximum and minimum represented 
cases above the highest and below the lowest, respectively: thus, for life expectancy the minimum was lowered to 24 years.  
 9 
dex (EI), which is an equal-weighted geometric average of the Mean years of schooling index 
(MYSI), measured as the mean years of schooling divided by 13.2 (the maximum value observed in 
the sample, United States in 2000; the minimum equals zero), and the Expected years of schooling 
index (EYSI), measured as the expected years of schooling divided by 20.6 (the maximum value 
observed in the sample, Australia in 2002; the minimum equals zero); EI is then proportioned on a 
maximum of 0.951, the maximum value of the combined Education index observed in the sample 
(new Zealand in 2010), and a minimum of 0. For resources (X3), measured through the Income in-
dex (II), (ln of) Gross national income, expressed in 2008 US$ PPP, is used instead of (ln of) Gross 
Domestic Product, (ln of) 108,211 and (ln of) 163 being respectively the maximum (United Arab 
Emirates in 1980) and minimum (Zimbabwe in 2008) values observed in the sample.9 The three 
components are then weighted through a geometric mean, according to the formula: 
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To sum up, the three main innovations are: a) the use of a geometric mean to weight the three 
components, which reduces substitutability among them and was common also to the improved 
HDI; b) the return to empirical (rather than theoretical) thresholds; c) a remarkable refinement of 
the Education indicator, together with some refinement of the Income indicator.11  
At a first glance, the new index represents a considerable advance upon the old one. At a first 
glance. A more in-depth analyses reveals remarkable inconsistencies with both the capability ap-
proach and the proposed goals of economic policy. First, for what concerns the education indicator, 
the last refinement is indeed a further step away from a measure consistent with the capability ap-
proach: literacy was, after all, the only indicator easily understandable in terms of capabilities, and 
it is now abandoned. But the major inconsistency is probably another one. As efficaciously pointed 
out by Ravallion, after the introduction of the geometric mean, tradeoffs between the single compo-
nents have become troubling, at least. In Ravallion’s words: 
 
                                                 
9
 GDP looks indeed more appropriate, since it captures the income from national citizens living abroad, namely the remittances from 
emigrants, while excluding the income produced within the country which goes to foreign citizens. 
10
 In the 2010 UNDR, the new HDI is estimated for benchmark years from 1980 up to 2010. The report also presents an inequality 
adjusted Human development index (IHDI), which is in turn a geometric mean of geometric means – each one computed by dis-
counting each dimension’s average value according to its level of inequality, based on a distribution-sensitive class of composite in-
dices. 
11
 Out of the possible innovations, the proposal of using a convex function rather than the linear transformation for the non-income 
components was not received, since it was considered inconsistent with the capability approach: for example, at a late age a further 
increase in life expectancy should not result into a more than proportionally greater capability of living a long and healthy life. In-
deed, in the case of income, following Anand and Sen (2000), it was reasserted that the concave form of the transformation function 
was more in line with the capability approach. 
 10 
Longevity in poor countries has been substantially devalued, though it seems unlikely that this was intended. The 
HDI’s valuation of longevity in the poorest country is now a mere 0.006% of its value in the richest country − a far 
greater difference than in their average incomes (for which the poorest country has 0.2% of the national income per cap-
ita of the richest). A poor country experiencing falling life expectancy due to (say) a collapse in its already weak health-
care system could still see its HDI improve with even a small rate of economic growth. By contrast, the valuations of 
extra schooling have risen for most countries and they seem high − some four times higher than the valuations typically 
placed by the labor market on extra schooling. (Ravallion, 2012b, p. 208). 
 
Ravallion holds that these troubling tradeoffs could be largely avoided by using some alterna-
tive specifications of Chakravarty’s “generalized old HDI” formula, together with replacing Ln 
GDP with GDP in the Income index and with using the arithmetic mean for the two schooling vari-
ables. In more detail, given the formula from Chakravarty (2003): 
 
(6) HDIc = [f(LeI) + f(EI) + f(II)] / 3 
  
Ravallion proposes two special cases of ( ) II rxxf = , for (0 < r < 1) (the old HDI is the limiting 
case when r = 1, with perfect substitutability), when r = 0.5 and 0.25. These coefficients maintain 
some imperfect substitutability and have inter-component tradeoffs more in line with the declared 
goal of the index. It goes without saying, however, that these coefficients too are somehow arbitrary 
and so are the tradeoffs. Furthermore, Ravallion himself does not provide any guide to sort between 
the virtually unlimited possible values of r, although he shows some preference for a 0.5 value.12 
As mentioned, the HDI had been introduced to give policy makers “one simple number” 
through which to devise and assess more people-centred policies. After more than two decades of 
debates and refinements, the result was either a number which would favour less people-centered 
policies (the new HDI) or an unlimited amount of alternatives, i.e. too many numbers which, of 
course, mean no number at all. 
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 Limitedly to the trade-offs between GDP per capita and life expectancy, there is indeed a literature dating back to the 
1970s, which follows the utilitarian approach. Namely Usher (1973, 1980) has proposed to assign to life expectancy a 
weight inversely proportional to a parameter, β, which is assumed to be the elasticity of annual utility with respect to 
consumption; however, there is no consensus about the value of β, which could range from 0.25 to 0.45 (Usher, 1973; 
Williamson, 1984; Costa and Steckel, 1997), and of course these changes in the parameter β can have a significant im-
pact on the final index (for a recent example, based on the Italian case, see Brandolini and Vecchi, 2013). More re-
cently, Jones and Klenow (2010) have proposed a money metric of social welfare based on expected utilities, which ad-
justs consumption per person, at purchasing-power parity, to allow for differences in longevity, leisure and inequality; 
this method too requires the specification ex-ante of an utility function, being consistent with the utilitarian approach 
and thus subject to the same criticisms: inevitable arbitrariness in trying to assign objective values (and weights) to sub-
jective preferences.  
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3. MIXED FOUNDATIONS: THE GENUINE PROGRESS INDICATOR AND THE 
HAPPY PLANET INDEX 
 
 
Measures of economic performance alternative to both GDP and HDI can be subject to criti-
cisms similar to those raised against HDI, after allowing for the different theoretical approaches. 
Being impossible to review all of the indices recently proposed, whose number is growing almost 
day by day, we are going to concentrate on the most popular two, the Genuine progress indicator 
(GPI) − a “green” GDP − and the Happy planet index (HPI). These are the only two which gained 
some success at the institutional level, as testified by the adoption by Chinese and Indian govern-
ment of the “green” GDP accounting system (e.g. Financial Express Bureau, 2009), or by the sup-
port expressed by the UK conservative leader Cameron in favour of HPI (Parker, 2007).  
Unlike GDP, GPI is a measure of economic growth which aims to distinguish between good and 
bad growth. Its foundations date back to a seminal work of Daly and Coby (1989) and are similar to 
those of the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) and of other “green” GDP accounting 
systems. “While methodologies are somewhat different – as synthesized in the GPI 2006 report –  
the ISEW, GPI, and other green GDP accounting systems all involve three basic steps”. The starting 
point are estimates of personal consumption expenditures, “which are weighted by an index of the 
inequality in the distribution of income to reflect the social costs of inequality and diminishing re-
turns to income received by the wealthy” (Talberth, Cobb, and Slattery, 2007, p. 3). The second step 
consists of a number of additions, “made to account for the non-market benefits associated with 
volunteer time, housework, parenting, and other socially productive time uses as well as services 
from both household capital and public infrastructure.” The third step consists of deductions, “to 
account for purely defensive expenditures such as pollution related costs or the costs of automobile 
accidents as well as costs that reflect the undesirable side effects of economic progress”. Other kind 
of deductions, “for costs associated with degradation and depletion of natural capital incurred by 
existing and future generations are also made at this stage (ibid, p. 3; see also Stockhammer et al., 
1997; Neumayer, 2000). In more detail, the GPI is derived from 25 indicators, according to the for-
mula:  
 
(7) GPI = PC / (GI × 100) + VHP + VHE + VVW + SCD + SH − CCr − LLT − CUn – CCD – 
CCom – CHPA – CAA – CWP – CAP – CNP – LWL – LFL – LPF – RD – CDED – COD +/− NCI 
+/− NFB; 
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where PC is personal consumption; GI, Gini Index; VHP, value of housework and parenting; 
VHE, value of higher education; VVW, value of volunteer work; SCD, services of consumer dur-
ables; SH, services of highways; CCr, cost of crime; LLT, loss of leisure time; CUn, cost of under-
employment; Ccom, cost of commuting; CHPA, cost of household pollution abatement; CAA, cost 
of auto accidents; CWP, cost of water pollution; CAP, cost of air pollution; CNP, cost of noise pol-
lution; LWL, loss of wetlands; LFL, loss of farmland; LPF, loss of primary forests; RD, resource 
depletion; CDED, carbon dioxide emission damage; COD, cost of ozone depletion; NCI, net capital 
investment; NFB, net foreign borrowing (Talberth, Cobb, and Slattery, 2007, pp. 8-18).  
Although not devoid of foundations in both economic theory and the principles of sustainable 
development, unsurprisingly such a measure too has raised severe criticisms, concerning either its 
theoretical foundations, calculation methods, and the choice of components (for an overview, see 
ibid, p. 7). Over the years, successive refinements have coped with some computational problems, 
but the result is still far from answering to what is probably the main objection, concerning the arbi-
trariness of what GPI includes or excludes. This arbitrariness is due to the lack of consistent con-
ceptual foundations. Apparently, the index is trying to measure “sustainable utility”. But this ambi-
tion reveals two fundamentals contradictions. 
First, being highly subjective “utility” cannot be measured by any objective index. For example, 
personal consumption is discounted by income inequality on the reasonable assumption that rising 
income inequality hinders economic welfare (Hsing, 2005), but why the Gini index is used instead 
of other measures is unclear,13 neither the assumption of a linear function between growth in ine-
quality (whatever the corresponding index may be) and reduction in welfare is discussed and justi-
fied. Moreover, as emphasized by Neumayer (1999), GPI does not allow for corrections for other 
dimensions having an effect on utility, such as degree of political freedom or degree of inequality 
between sexes. Still, disservice items (such as commuting costs, the loss of leisure, etc.) are highly 
subjective and cannot be computed on the basis of objective measures: for example, the loss of lei-
sure is measured in terms of the average real wage rate, but this can hardly be the same for every 
citizen: rather, every citizen should have computed her/his own leisure time in terms of his/her own 
wage rate; furthermore, as stressed among the others by Rymes (1992) and Lawn (2005), it is un-
clear whether or not these disservice costs have been already included into household and worker 
decisions. Indeed, the only way of measuring utility consistent with the utility approach should be 
to subjectively quantify the utility of each person, for example by asking people how much they are 
happy. This is what the Happy Planet Index tries to do, but this method does not escape the overall 
                                                 
13
 As known, the Gini index has some mathematical limitations: it tends to increase with the size of the population (and thus of the 
country) and does not perfectly replicate income distribution (because of differing shapes of the Lorenz curves, two countries scoring 
the same Gini index and the same income average may have a very different income distribution). 
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criticism to the utility approach, as formulated most notoriously by Amartya Sen (1999; see for-
ward).  
The second contradiction comes with the adjective “sustainable”. As pointed out efficaciously 
by Dietz and Neumayer (2006, p. 189), it is “not possible to combine an indicator of current welfare 
with an indicator of sustainability”: the depletion of non-renewable resources, in fact, can hardly 
have an impact on current welfare, i.e. on utility. However, deductions for natural capital depletion 
have some foundations in the economic theory, as pointed out by defenders of GPI such as Lawn 
(2003), in fact they are consistent with the traditional Fisher’s definition of capital and income 
(Fisher, 1906). The point here is that the concepts of capital and income should be properly linked 
to the wealth approach, rather than to the utility one, i.e. used to refine and improve GDP. But this 
is another matter (see next section). For now, let’s just turn our attention to the Happy Planet Index. 
The Happly Planet Index (HPI) is a measure of the ecological efficiency of supporting well-
being. Its formula looks more straightforward than GPI’s and, by some regards, more appealing. 
The only three components are life expectancy, life satisfaction, and the ecological footprint. Via 
multiplying life expectancy by life satisfaction, a composite indicator called Happy Life Years 
(HLY) is estimated, which is then divided by the Ecological Footprint (EF) to calculate the index; 
the addition of two constant (α and β) is also necessary, in order to standardize variations and then 
tradeoffs among the components:14 
 
(8) HPI = [ HLY / (EF + α) ] × β. 
 
Data on life satisfaction are obtained by asking to a sample of people a simple question: All 
things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?, with responses rang-
ing from 0 (unsatisfied) to 10 (satisfied) (Abdallah et al., 2009, p. 52). The ecological footprint of 
an individual (per capita), expressed in units of “global hectares”, is a measure of the amount of 
land required to provide for all her/his resource requirements, plus the amount of vegetated land re-
quired to absorb all her/his CO2 emissions and the CO2 emissions embodied in the products she/he 
consumes.15 Estimates of global hectares allow to estimate the total amount of productive hectares 
available on the entire planet: by dividing this amount by the world’s population, it is then possible 
to calculate a global per capita figure, «on the basis that everyone is entitled to the same amount of 
the planet’s natural resources» (id., p. 12). 
                                                 
14
 Their value changes according to the values in the sample: in the 2005 report, α was 3.35 and β 6.42; see the report (Abdallah et 
al., 2009), pp. 54 and 60, for more details. In the 2012 HPI report some refinements on the statistical adjustments are introduced (Ab-
dallah et al., 2012, pp. 20-21), following Eurostat (2012). 
15
 Ecological footprint data for 2005 were available from WWF (2008). 
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Although this methodology is still a matter of some discussion, the ecological footprint is an ob-
jective measure (at least, one aiming to be so), with no arbitrariness. This is true also for life expec-
tancy, of course, but the same can’t be said for life satisfaction, its importance (Layard, 2011) and 
considerable efforts in producing and collecting measures of happiness (Helliwell et al., 2012) not-
withstanding. Thus the HPI is an indicator combining objective and subjective measures of well-
being. In conceptual terms, it looks like a mixture of the utilitarian and the wealth approach. Life 
satisfaction is an utilitarian measure, whereas life expectancy and the ecological footprint are meas-
ures of wealth (respectively, the number of years an individual has, and a measure of the ecological 
efficiency in order to produce a certain amount of wealth). 
The problem is that the utilitarian and the wealth approach are not reconcilable. More in detail, 
utilitarian measures, being subjective, should not be used as indices of economic performance to-
gether with wealth indices. Amartya Sen (1999, pp. 54–110) has made a good point against the use 
of utilitarian measures as objective indicators, and his lesson should not be overlooked. The two 
main problems are distributional indifference (happiness can be less costly for some people, but it 
would be unfair to give these people lesser opportunities) and – even a worse one, when it comes to 
cross-country comparisons – adaptation and mental conditioning: people can adapt to oppressive 
situations, and thus the utilitarian approach can be unfair towards people living in oppressive coun-
tries, ending up by justifying those oppressions (in the largest sense, including also the oppressions 
deriving from a lack of material resources).16 This in part what happens with HPI: in the top ten 
ranking we find countries such as Guatemala and Honduras (Abdallah et al., 2009, p. 61), where 
life is hard by any objective standard. Such amazing results look, indeed, unacceptable by any rea-
sonable standard. 
                                                 
16
 A solution to these problems can be the use of positional interpretations, which take into account the social stratifica-
tion of the interviewed people; intermediate between opinions and objective facts, «objective in the sense that they may 
convey a reflected evaluation and engagement», positional interpretations «can be seen as points of contact between in-
dividuals and the social structures in which they live» (Comim and Amaral, 2013, p. 5). They are used in the construc-
tion of the Human Value Index (HVI), a composite indicator on the line of HDI, which aims to build a bridge between 
the capability approach and the subjective well-being one. Up to the present, HVI has been proposed only for Brazil 
(ibid) and, even after accepting the validity of the positional interpretations approach, it may be subject to the same 
criticisms raised against HDI. 
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4. THE WEALTH APPROACH: HOW TO BUILD A MORE INCLUSIVE SYSTEM OF 
NATIONAL ACCOUNTS (AND WHY IT DID NOT SUCCEED) 
 
 
The enduring success of GDP is due, by first instance, to its coherent conceptual foundations, 
which can be referable to the wealth approach. In a nutshell, GDP is a monetary measure of the 
amount of resources (goods and services) saleable in the market that an economy can produce 
(Beckerman, 1987; Feinstein, 1987; Lequiller and Blades, 2006). It is therefore a measure of in-
come, i.e. of the wealth produced in a certain time period (one year, one month, etc.). Wealth, or re-
sources, are something we can measure with a reasonable degree of “objectivity”,17 unlike with ca-
pabilities or utilities, the “functions” underlying alternative indices. That said, it doesn’t mean that 
there is no room for discussion about the components and the measures of wealth. There is indeed, 
the debate is large and old, and as a consequence there is now theoretical consensus and empirical 
data on how to refine GDP in order to include, at the very least, environmental costs − as we are go-
ing to illustrate. However, the very fact that so far not even refined measures of GDP, which safely 
remain within the borders of the wealth approach, have been successful, leads us to the second, 
more profound and fundamental reason behind GDP enduring primacy: it was the indicator thought 
to measure economic change in capitalist-market economies,18 where we still live today; the pre-
vailing values in these societies, and the interests of their dominant social actors, are informed to the 
dimensions which are directly measured by GDP (or GDP). Other dimensions incorporated by al-
ternative indices are not of their immediate concern. 
Let’s make two basic examples. There are two fundamental adjustments to GDP which have 
been proposed and can be considered within the wealth approach: the system of national accounts 
should be expanded to include (mostly women’s) unpaid work and the value of environment. Both 
these issues have been brought to relevance by the seminal book of Marilyn Waring, If women 
counted, published about a quarter of a century ago (Waring, 1988), but were a subject of academic 
discussion at least since the 1970s. Concerning unpaid work, it is fair to acknowledge that the 
Genuine Progress Indicator has made some efforts to include it, although limitedly to the United 
                                                 
17
 Some cautiousness is warranted on this too, however. Objectiveness can be achieved if we assume that market prices 
tend to the cost of production (or to some other objective measure), as assumed for example in classical political econ-
omy. But if market prices depend upon subjective factors such as subjective preferences, as in marginal utility theory, 
there is no objectivity anymore. In fact, GDP reflects the values of capitalist society, and this becomes manifest in mar-
ket prices, and in the quantities produced too. John Kenneth Galbraith (1958) famously noted this, and his discussion 
remains most relevant today. 
18
 The first official estimates of national income were published in the US in 1934 by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research, with the decisive contribution by Simon Kuznets (cfr. Carson, 1975). 
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States, by counting the value of household work and parenting. The procedure has been developed 
by John Kendrick (1979), whose idea was to calculate the non-market household production as the 
product of the hourly wages of domestic workers and the number of hours devoted to unpaid house-
hold work. Following this approach, for the US Robert Eisner (1989) has produced benchmark es-
timates (for 1965, 1975 and 1981) via using the annual hours spent performing relevant household 
tasks as calculated by the Michigan Survey Research Center, at their market price (i.e., the amount 
that a family would have to pay to hire someone to do equivalent work in their home); GPI’s re-
searchers have later extended Eisner’s data to cover more benchmarks (1985, 2003, 2004) 
(Talberth, Cobb, and Slattery, 2007, p. 9). Such methodology looks reasonably reliable, although 
subject to a number of assumptions, but it is also highly data demanding − and this is the reason 
why to replicate the GPI’s figures for other countries different from the US goes well beyond the 
scope of this article. It is worth noticing, however, that the share of the value of houserwork and 
parenting is all but irrilevant, usually higher the lower GDP is: for the US, it passed from about two 
thirds of personal consumption in 1950, to about one third in 2004 (my calculations from ibid, p. 
21).  
Recent research has also emphasized as environmental accounting can be reconciled with the 
system of national accounts, i.e., as the contributions of nature to human welfare can be defined and 
measured in a way consistent with the wealth approach (Boyd and Banzhaf, 2007; Ferreira et al., 
2008).19 Dimensions as the depletion and degradation of natural resources, the consumption of fixed 
capital, and the negative consequences of pollution, can be included in the GDP or GDP indices. 
Unlike with unpaid work, in this case the value of these components is relatively easy to obtain 
from official international sources. For instance, an environment-augmented  GDP (GDPe) can be 
calculated as: 
 
(9) GDPe = GDP – CFC – MD – ED – NFD – CDD – WPD – PED; 
 
where GDP is Gross National Income, i.e. the sum of value added by all resident producers plus 
any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of pri-
mary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad; CFC is consumption 
of fixed capital (the replacement value of capital used up in the process of production); MD is an 
estimate of mineral depletion; ED is an estimate of energy depletion; NFD is an estimate of net for-
est depletion; CDD is an estimate of carbon oxide damage (basic air pollution); WPD is an estimate 
of water pollution damage (water pollution); PED is an estimate of particular emission damage 
                                                 
19
 For a broader discussion of ecological economics and of its connections with the neoclassical school and with hetero-
dox economics, see Douai et al. (2012), Özkaynak et al. (2012), Spash and Ryan (2012). 
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(other pollution). Almost all of the necessary data for these variables (GDP, CFC, MD, ED, NFD, 
CDD, PED), can be taken from the World Bank dataset (World Bank, 2013); only WPD (water pol-
lution damage) has to be estimated, as the product of the organic water pollutant emissions (from 
the same source) and the average cost per kg/day of water pollutant (from Dodds et al., 2009).20 As 
a result, from the sources above I have produced estimates of GDPe for 130 countries, in 2005;21 in 
table 1 and figure 1 these are presented and compared with the standard GDP, as well as with the 
new HDI and with HPI.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
As expected, there is a high correlation between GDP and GDPe, the main difference being that 
this latter lowers the value of oil exporting countries (most remarkably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Nor-
way, Trinidad and Tobago, all outliers in the upper left quadrant of figure 1) which are heavily de-
pleting their energy wealth. GDPe also displays a higher correlation with the new HDI and with HPI 
than the standard GDP does. It should not pass unnoticed, however, that the regression line which 
best fits the correlation between GDP/GDPe and the new HDI, and to a much minor extent also HPI, 
is a cubic or a quadratic one:22 this suggests the existence of a non-monotonic relationship between 
income and either human development or well-being, and the use of an environment-augmented  
GDP only confirms this finding.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
In short, an environment-augmented  GDP would meet some of the concerns motivating the 
supporters of HDI and HPI, while being at the same conceptually consistent with the wealth ap-
proach and even more capable of measuring the effective capacity of producig income (by making 
some distinction between the production of income and the exploitment of natural resources) than 
the standard GDP. Morevoer, it would not be so difficult to produce world statistics of environ-
ment-corrected GDP or GDP, as we have seen. But then, why such attempts of environmental ac-
                                                 
20
 In more detail, the average cost per kg/day of water pollutant has been estimated using data on total potential annual 
value losses due to water pollution (losses in recreational water usage, waterfront real estate, spending on recovery of 
threatened and endangered species, and drinking water) for the United States in 2008 (Dodds et al., 2009); the total was 
divided by the US organic water pollutant emission in 2008 (World Bank, 2011), and extrapolated backward to 2005 
using the cost of living index; the average cost per kg/day of water pollutant for the United States was then applied to 
other countries after being converted through PPP coefficients (from the same source). 
21
 In order to have comparable figures, all the data for (9) have been expressed at purchasing power parities (interna-
tional PPP dollars, deflators are also from World Bank, 2011). 
22
 The fit lines are the following. Between GDP and new HDI: 0.633 linear, 0.842 quadratic, 0.862 cubic. Between 
GDPe and the new HDI: 0.644 linear, 0.873 quadratic, 0.896 cubic. Between GDP and HPI: 0.001 linear, 0.116 quad-
ratic, 0.136 cubic. Between GDPe and HPI: 0.002 linear, 0.119 quadratic, 0.141 cubic.  
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counting have passed almost unnoticed thus far? The answer could be that the standard GDP re-
flects the prevailing values of our societies, that are capitalist-market economies, and their interests 
and goals, better than possible alternatives do. Namely, standard GDP measures the income which 
is produced and sold in the market. Neither housework, by definition, not even environmental goods 
are produced and sold in the market, even though they can be substitutes of saleable goods and ser-
vices (in fact, this is the way they are computed in the wealth accounting). Indeed, housework and 
enviroment wealth is not a one that is currently monetized and exchanged in the market (and even 
to treat it as a market good is an artifice): our capitalist-market economies are relatively uninter-
ested in it.  
Having this answer in mind, we can look at the debate about composite indicators with clearer 
eyes. Each composite indicator, in its weights and components, reflects the preferences of a society. 
These are the product of the way the society is organized, of the struggle between different players 
and social actors, of the resulting prevailing values and interests. As we have seen, the idea which 
motivated the birth of HDI − and in the end of all the composite indicators which followed − was to 
provide one single number which would serve as guide to policy makers (UNDP, 1999, p. 23), a 
one which would take into account social and environmental dimensions. But this wish is based on 
the illusion that the policy maker is a neutral actor, who could only be glad to take an indicator 
more inclusive than GDP, if available. Instead, the policy maker is the result of social dynamics, 
and social struggle, and would take an indicator alternative to GDP only after − and not before − the 
preference system of a society has changed. Such a new indicator could be a composite one, an im-
proved version of GDP as the one we have presented in this section, or even another simple indica-
tor radically different from GDP: life expectancy, for instance, if the dominant value of a society 
becomes longevity rather than money; education, if it becomes knowledge; the degree of personal 
freedom; the per capita amount of clean air, and so on. 
Meantime, the different groups of a society contend to affirm their competing values. The pri-
macy of GDP is questioned by those groups who devalue monetary wealth in favour of other di-
mensions, from environment to well-being, to knowledge or freedom, and thus (implicitly or explic-
itly) are proposing a different society than the current capitalist-market one. Since the invention of 
HDI, the art of producing indicators ex cathedra has flourished. They can be useful for historical 
analysis (Prados, 2013) or to enrich the development debate,23 but in terms of policy guidance, that 
is for the social actors who confront each other, as we have seen composite indicators are useless 
and even confusing, given that: 1) they hide more than they highlight; 2) they take for granted dif-
                                                 
23
 In Ravallion’s words: «Composite indices derived from development-data mashups are often trying to attach a num-
ber to an important, but unobserved, concept, for which prevailing theories and measurement practices offer little guid-
ance» (2012a, p. 24). 
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ferent preference systems, which have not come to light from the social corpus (and arguably do not 
exist).  
So, what should we do? Two competing alternative strategies can be followed, their viability 
depending upon the researcher’s goals. One is the multivariate analysis, which does not superim-
pose any given system of preferences and values, but derives it from the empirical analysis of the 
observed sample (e.g. Munda, 2012). Although from theoretical grounds it is an intriguing tool, for 
(our) practical purposes it can hardly be regarded as a viable path. It has not only computational 
problems in the presence of a high number of observations, as Munda (ibid, p. 19) acknowledges, 
but also a potential bias due to the way the sample is constructed: the weighting schemes (and of 
course the results) are dependent on the indicators and countries selected. Therefore it can be useful 
to solve specific policy problem, in the presence of different and competing preference systems, but 
to claim for a general validity it should include all the possible indicators reflecting all the range of 
different preferences, for all the possible cases of the sample (in our case, for all the countries of the 
world) − virtually impossible.  
The other strategy is a dashboard approach, as proposed among the others by Ravallion (2011) 
for poverty assessment, i.e. the use of a battery of indicators, each one reflecting one dimension and 
thus tracking a specific problem. While in principle it has not pretension of general value, it may be 
a good policy instrument, insofar it provides each social groups struggling to pursue its own goal, 
and thus hoping to change the society accordingly to its own values and interests, with its proper 
quantitative backing. GDP is only one of these dashboard indicators: it is the one with general 
value, up to the present, simply because it reflects the values and interests of the capitalist-market 
societies of our days. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
In the last decades several composite indices have been proposed, in order to measure economic 
development or prosperity in a more inclusive way that the standard system of national accounts 
does. Despite considerable efforts and a lot of debate, however, thus far none of these has proved 
itself able to replace the standard GDP. In order to find the reasons of this failure, the first part of 
the article has critically reviewed what are currently the most popular indices alternative to GDP, 
that is the Human Development Index, the Genuine Progress Indicator, and the Happy Planet Index. 
These composite indicators are here criticized on the argument, so far relatively overlooked, of their 
faulty conceptual foundations: a case is made that neither the capability approach nor utilitarianism 
are suitable to be conveyed into an objective measure which can serve as a guide for policy makers; 
unlike the wealth approach, the one behind GDP and the system of national accounts. In the second 
part of the article, we have argued that well-being and ecological goals, the main concerns motivat-
ing the indices alternative to GDP, can instead be coherently included into an extended wealth ap-
proach, that is into the same conceptual framework underlying the current system of national ac-
counts. Limitedly to the environmental component, an example is provided for the world countries, 
using data from the World Bank. Such improvements upon the standard national accounting turn 
out ot be relatively feasible and theoretically consistent, and yet up to the present neither these have 
been successful in supplanting the traditional measures. This second failure suggests that among the 
reasons behind the enduring success of GDP there are not only conceptual consistency, or statistical 
soundness, but also «social suitability», being the standard system of national accounts better able 
to reflect the dominant values of our capitalist-market economies, where it was developed, and their 
related prevailing interests. As far as environmental and social components are not directly pro-
duced and sold in the market, even though they can be measured at market prices they are of little 
interest to capitalist-market societies. 
Once we acknowledge that composite indicators cannot be superimposed upon the actual struc-
ture of a given society, but are rather the product of a prevailing preference system upon others, we 
realize that searching for and developing composite indicators alternative to GDP is trivial, until 
when the current preference system has not been changed. And in order to achieve such a change 
composite indicators can even be misleading, since as we have seen their underlying preference sys-
tem is all but intelligible, and it may even be at odds with their conceptual foundations. By this re-
gard, a dashboard approach is preferable since it provides the different social groups with clear and 
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undisputable quantitative instruments. Let’s change the society, maybe using a dashboard of meas-
urement instruments as a guidance for that: and then the alternative to GDP, with a new universal 
breadth, will come out from the new prevalining values and interests. Not viceversa. Or alterna-
tively, believe in and pursue a society where no longer there are dominant groups and interests: that 
would be the world of the dashboard approach, and maybe of the multivariate analysis to solve spe-
cific policy problems in a multiple system of preferences. 
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Table 1. GDP, GDPe, new HDI and HPI for 130 countries, 2005  
Absolute figures Country ranks 
Country Population GDP  GDPe new HDI HPI 
 (million) 2005 PPP $ 2005 PPP $ (0-1) (0-100) 
Rank GDP GDPe new Hdi HPI 
Albania 3,154 6197 5500 0.700 47.91 1 Norway                          United States+2                   Norway                          Costa Rica+48                      
Algeria 32,854 6820 3843 0.651 51.23 2 Kuwait                          Singapore+2            Australia+13                       Dominican R.+65                   
Angola 16,095 3238 1191 0.376 26.78 3 United States                   Norway-2                          New Zealand+19                     Jamaica+58                    
Argentina 38,747 10424 8027 0.749 58.95 4 Singapore                       Switzerland+1                     United States-1                   Guatemala+72                       
Armenia 3,018 4274 3636 0.669 48.28 5 Switzerland                  Netherlands+1                     Ireland+5                         Vietnam+89                        
Australia 20,400 31513 24820 0.925 36.64 6 Netherlands                     United King.+3                    Sweden+6                          Colombia+53                        
Austria 8,233 33052 27781 0.841 47.69 7 Canada                          Ireland+3                         Canada                          Cuba+50                            
Azerbaijan 8,392 3937 1581 0.655 41.21 8 Denmark                         Sweden+4                          Germany+6                         El Salvador+62                     
Bangladesh 153,281 1123 997 0.432 54.09 9 United King.                    Canada-2                          Netherlands-3                     Brazil+45                          
Belarus 9,776 8543 7443 0.706 35.67 10 Ireland                         Austria+1                         Japan+6                           Honduras+75                        
Belgium 10,479 32335 27317 0.858 45.36 11 Austria                         Denmark-3                         Switzerland-6                     Nicaragua+80                       
Benin 8,490 1205 1093 0.418 24.58 12 Sweden                          Germany+2      Finland+6                         Egypt+59                           
Bolivia  9,182 4321 2919 0.631 49.35 13 Belgium                         Belgium                         Israel+11                          Saudi Arabia+13       
Bosnia-Herz. 3,781 6496 5730 0.698 44.96 14 Germany                         Kuwait-12                          Denmark-6                         Philippines+70                    
Botswana 1,836 10831 9229 0.593 20.85 15 Australia       France+2                          Belgium-2                         Argentina+28                       
Brazil 186,831 8228 6986 0.678 61.01 16 Japan                           Finland+2                         France+1                Indonesia+70                       
Bulgaria 7,740 9837 8188 0.724 42.04 17 France                          Australia-2                       Korea (South)+8                   Panama+34                          
Burkina Faso 13,933 1023 931 0.285 22.40 18 Finland                         Japan-2                           Spain+2                           Laos+82                            
Burundi 7,859 311 258 0.239 21.84 19 Italy                           Italy                         United King.-10                    China+56                           
Cambodia 13,956 1377 1262 0.466 42.34 20 Spain                           Spain                           Austria-9                         Morocco+61                         
Cameroon 17,795 1904 1619 0.437 27.22 21 Greece                          Greece                          Greece                          Sri Lanka+61                       
Canada 32,312 34377 28062 0.880 39.40 22 New Zealand                     Slovenia+1                        Italy-3                           Mexico+15                          
Centr. Afr. R. 4,191 643 597 0.299 22.88 23 Slovenia                        Israel+1                          Czech R.+6                        Pakistan+69                        
Chad 10,146 1108 403 0.299 34.27 24 Israel                          New Zealand-2                     Singapore-20                       Ecuador+39                         
Chile 16,295 11094 8579 0.762 49.72 25 Korea (South)                   Korea (South)                   Slovenia-2                        Jordan+47                          
China 1304,500 4131 3456 0.616 57.11 26 Saudi Arabia                    Portugal+1                        Estonia+5            Peru+40                            
Colombia 44,946 6736 5502 0.658 66.10 27 Portugal                        Czech R.+1                        Hungary+3                         Tunisia+38                         
Congo 3,610 2196 325 0.470 32.43 28 Czech R.                        Slovakia+4                        Slovakia+4                        Trini. and Tob+1.                 
Congo-D.Rep. 58,741 255 227 0.223 29.04 29 Trini. and Tob.                 Estonia+2                    Portugal-2                        Bangladesh+80                     
Costa Rica 4,327 8648 8051 0.708 76.12 30 Hungary                         Hungary                         Lithuania+5                       Moldova+58                         
Croatia 4,443 14824 12732 0.752 47.23 31 Estonia                         Croatia+2                         Poland+6                          Malaysia+8                        
Cuba 11,260 7462 7231 n.a. 65.68 32 Slovakia                        Lithuania+2                       Kuwait-30                          Tajikistan+72                      
Czech R. 10,234 19452 15441 0.838 38.31 33 Croatia                         Poland+2                          Latvia+3                          India+57                           
Denmark 5,416 33677 27428 0.860 35.47 34 Lithuania                       Saudi Arabia-8                    Chile+6                           Venezuela+11                       
Dominican R. 9,470 5893 5160 0.638 71.78 35 Poland                          Latvia+1                          Croatia-2                         Nepal+81                           
Ecuador 13,061 6385 4627 0.676 55.46 36 Latvia                          Mexico+1                          Argentina+7                       Syrian Arab R.+42                  
Egypt 72,850 4561 3428 0.587 60.32 37 Mexico                          Turkey+5                          Romania+10                         Myanmar+76                         
El Salvador 6,668 4992 4433 0.635 61.46 38 Russian Fed.                    Botswana+3                        Uruguay+9                         Algeria+21                         
Estonia 1,346 15871 13569 0.805 26.42 39 Malaysia                        Chile+1       Saudi Arabia-13                    Thailand+21                        
Ethiopia 75,173 627 540 0.287 28.10 40 Chile                           Trini. and Tob.-11                 Mexico-3                          Netherlands-34     
Finland 5,246 30826 26132 0.863 47.23 41 Botswana                        Malaysia-2                        Malaysia-2                        Uzbekistan+54                      
France 60,873 30908 26869 0.856 43.86 42 Turkey          Uruguay+4                         Bulgaria+2                        Chile-2                           
Georgia 4,473 3555 3190 0.679 43.60 43 Argentina                       Bulgaria+1                        Panama+9                  Bolivia+30                         
Germany 82,469 31736 27336 0.878 48.07 44 Bulgaria                        Costa Rica+5                      Serbia+9                          Armenia+30                         
Ghana 22,535 1146 1031 0.443 37.10 45 Venezuela                       Argentina-2                       Trini. and Tob.-16                 Singapore-41                       
Greece 11,104 24224 21290 0.839 37.58 46 Uruguay                         Romania+1                      Costa Rica+3                      Yemen+50                           
Guatemala 12,710 4014 3542 0.533 68.37 47 Romania                         Panama+4                          Belarus+3                         Germany-33                         
Guinea 9,003 882 744 0.323 30.25 48 Iran                            Russian Fed.-10                    Albania+16                         Switzerland-43                     
Honduras 6,834 3144 2923 0.579 60.99 49 Costa Rica                      Belarus+1                         Bosnia-Herz+13                    Sweden-37                          
Hungary 10,087 16055 13401 0.798 38.86 50 Belarus                         Cuba+7                            Ukraine+18                         Albania+14                         
India 1094,583 2292 1934 0.482 53.03 51 Panama                          Serbia+2                          Kazakhstan+5                      Paraguay+28                        
Indonesia 220,558 2820 2159 0.561 58.92 52 South Africa                    South Africa                    Peru+14                            Austria-41                         
Iran  69,087 9144 5016 0.660 42.08 53 Serbia                          Brazil+1                          Russian Fed-15                    Serbia                          
Iraq 29,267 2417 534 n.a. 42.59 54 Brazil                          Macedonia+2                       Georgia+26                         Finland-36                         
Ireland 4,159 33081 28961 0.886 42.62 55 Kazakhstan                      Venezuela-10                       Brazil-1                          Croatia-21                         
Israel 6,924 23166 19953 0.861 44.49 56 Macedonia                       Bosnia-Herz.+6           Macedonia+1                       Kyrgyzstan+43                      
Italy 58,607 28056 23558 0.838 44.02 57 Cuba                            Jamaica+4                         Jamaica+4                         Belgium-44                     
Jamaica 2,655 6590 5722 0.676 70.09 58 Algeria                         Thailand+2                        Ecuador+6                         Bosnia-Herz.+4                    
Japan 127,773 31026 24567 0.873 43.25 59 Colombia                       Colombia                        Armenia+15                         Slovenia-36                        
Jordan 5,412 4450 3943 0.652 54.59 60 Thailand                        Albania+4                         Venezuela-15                       Israel-36                          
Kazakhstan 15,147 7832 3783 0.696 38.54 61 Jamaica                         Tunisia+4                         Iran-13                            Korea (South)-36                   
Kenya 35,599 1347 1205 0.443 27.77 62 Bosnia-Herz.                    Dominican R.+5                    Colombia-3                        Italy-43                           
Korea (South) 48,294 22688 19535 0.851 44.43 63 Ecuador                         Peru+3                            Turkey-21                          Romania-16                         
Kuwait 2,535 47440 27268 0.764 27.04 64 Albania                         Iran-16                           Azerbaijan+13                      France-47                          
Kyrgyzstan 5,144 1666 1440 0.572 47.09 65 Tunisia                         Ecuador-2                         Jordan+7                          Georgia+15                         
Laos 5,664 1627 1487 0.460 57.34 66 Peru                            Namibia+3                         Algeria-8                         Slovakia-34                        
Latvia 2,301 12872 10384 0.763 36.67 67 Dominican R.                    El Salvador+3                     Tunisia-2                         United King.-58                   
Lithuania 3,414 13857 11859 0.775 40.90 68 Ukraine                         Ukraine                         Dominican R.-1                    Japan-52                           
Macedonia 2,034 7585 6701 0.678 32.66 69 Namibia       Jordan+3                          Sri Lanka+13                       Spain-49                           
Madagascar 18,643 820 746 0.420 31.54 70 El Salvador                     Algeria-12                         El Salvador+1      Poland-35                          
Malawi 13,226 638 592 0.336 34.47 71 Egypt                           Kazakhstan-16                      Thailand-11                        Ireland-61                         
Malaysia 25,653 11207 8227 0.726 54.05 72 Jordan                          Armenia+2                         Bolivia+2                         Iraq+17                            
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Mali 11,611 965 881 0.279 25.77 73 Bolivia                         Guatemala+3                   Philippines+11                     Cambodia+32                        
Mauritania 2,963 1744 1288 0.411 38.21 74 Armenia                         Paraguay+5                        Paraguay+6                        Iran-26                          
Mexico 103,089 12379 10002 0.727 55.58 75 China                           China                           China                           Bulgaria-31                        
Moldova 3,877 2453 2201 0.606 54.08 76 Guatemala                       Egypt-5                           Moldova+12                         Turkey-34                          
Mongolia 2,554 2550 2004 0.588 34.95 77 Azerbaijan                      Sri Lanka5                       Botswana-36                        Azerbaijan                      
Morocco 30,143 3543 3171 0.536 56.75 78 Syrian Arab R.                  Georgia+2                         Mongolia+9 Lithuania-44                       
Mozambique 20,533 640 555 0.263 24.61 79 Paraguay                        Morocco+2                         Uzbekistan+17                      Norway-78                          
Myanmar  47,967 1026 913 0.406 51.23 80 Georgia                         Honduras+5                        South Africa-28                    Canada-73                          
Namibia 2,020 5277 4599 0.577 21.10 81 Morocco                         Bolivia-8                         Egypt-9                           Hungary-51                         
Nepal 27,094 963 874 0.400 51.91 82 Sri Lanka                       Philippines+2                     Honduras+3                        Kazakhstan-27                     
Netherlands 16,320 35274 29312 0.877 50.60 83 Angola                          Syrian Arab R.-5                  Namibia-14                         Czech R.-55                        
New Zealand 4,134 23513 19938 0.896 36.21 84 Philippines                     Moldova+4                         Syrian Arab R.-6                  Mauritania+14                     
Nicaragua 5,463 2248 2038 0.545 60.54 85 Honduras                        Indonesia+1                       Kyrgyzstan+14                      Ukraine-17                         
Niger 13,264 596 556 0.241 26.94 86 Indonesia                       Nicaragua+5   Indonesia                       Senegal+17                         
Nigeria 141,356 1525 1002 0.402 30.35 87 Mongolia                        Mongolia                        Tajikistan+17                      Greece-66             
Norway 4,623 47636 33799 0.932 40.36 88 Moldova                         India+2                           Nicaragua+3                       Portugal-61                        
Pakistan 155,772 2230 1910 0.468 55.56 89 Iraq                Pakistan+3                        Vietnam+5                        Uruguay-43                        
Panama 3,232 8516 7844 0.724 57.37 90 India                           Cameroon+7                        Morocco-9                       Ghana+18                           
Paraguay 5,899 3870 3478 0.619 47.80 91 Nicaragua                       Vietnam+3                        Guatemala-15                       Latvia-55                          
Peru 27,274 6027 5112 0.695 54.37 92 Pakistan                        Azerbaijan-15                      India-2                           Australia-77                       
Philippines 84,566 3202 2805 0.619 59.02 93 Congo                           Laos+7                            Congo                           New Zealand-71                     
Poland 38,165 13481 11404 0.775 42.75 94 Vietnam                        Kyrgyzstan+5                      Pakistan-2                        Belarus-44                        
Portugal 10,549 20978 17475 0.775 37.46 95 Uzbekistan                      Senegal+8                         Cambodia+10                        Denmark-87                         
Romania 21,634 9276 7891 0.733 43.89 96 Yemen                           Mauritania+8                      Laos+4                            Mongolia-9                        
Russian Fed. 143,150 11558 7631 0.693 34.47 97 Cameroon                        Tajikistan+2                      Kenya+9                           Russian Fed.-59                    
Rwanda 9,234 766 695 0.334 29.59 98 Mauritania                      Cambodia+7                        Ghana+11                           Malawi+27                          
Saudi Arabia 23,119 21613 10905 0.732 59.70 99 Kyrgyzstan                      Yemen-3                           Cameroon-2                        Chad+11                            
Senegal 11,770 1519 1335 0.388 38.03 100 Laos                            Sudan+1                           Bangladesh+9                      Macedonia-44                       
Serbia 7,441 8407 7146 0.719 47.63 101 Sudan                           Kenya+5                           Madagascar+18                      Congo-8                           
Sierra Leone 5,586 566 508 0.292 23.08 102 Nigeria                         Angola-19                          Benin+5                           Madagascar+17                      
Singapore 4,266 42218 35980 0.826 48.24 103 Senegal                         Benin+4   Togo+18                            United States-100                   
Slovakia 5,387 15496 13880 0.796 43.52 104 Tajikistan                      Ghana+4                           Mauritania-6                      Nigeria-2                         
Slovenia 2,001 23293 20173 0.813 44.53 105 Cambodia                        Nigeria-3                         Myanmar+8                         Guinea+12                          
South Africa 46,892 8480 7039 0.587 29.69 106 Kenya                           Bangladesh3                      Yemen-10                           Uganda+12                          
Spain 43,398 26991 22683 0.848 43.19 107 Benin                           Tanzania+5                        Nigeria-5                         South Africa-55                    
Sri Lanka 19,668 3502 3307 0.635 56.55 108 Ghana                           Burkina Faso+6                    Nepal+8                           Rwanda+12                          
Sudan 36,900 1557 1207 0.360 28.55 109 Bangladesh                      Zambia+2                         Senegal-6                         Congo-D.Rep.+21                    
Sweden 9,024 32958 28881 0.883 47.99 110 Chad                            Myanmar+3     Uganda+8                          Sudan-9                           
Switzerland 7,437 39157 32678 0.870 48.05 111 Zambia                          Mali+4                            Angola-28                          Ethiopia+14   
Syrian Arab R. 18,894 3879 2551 0.576 51.32 112 Tanzania                        Nepal+4                           Tanzania                        Kenya-6                           
Tajikistan 6,550 1427 1288 0.550 53.48 113 Myanmar                         Uganda+5                          Zambia-2                          Cameroon-16                        
Tanzania 38,478 1038 947 0.370 17.79 114 Burkina Faso                    Madagascar+5                      Sudan-12    Zambia-3                          
Thailand 63,003 6724 5643 0.631 50.90 115 Mali                            Guinea+2                          Malawi+9                          Kuwait-113                          
Togo 6,239 729 652 0.414 23.28 116 Nepal                           Rwanda+4                          Rwanda+4                          Niger+10                           
Trini. and Tob. 1,324 18979 8504 0.713 54.21 117 Guinea                          Togo+4      Guinea                          Angola-34                          
Tunisia 10,029 6076 5207 0.650 54.31 118 Uganda                          Centr. Afr. R.+4                  Centr. Afr. R.+4                     Estonia-87      
Turkey 72,065 10710 9372 0.656 41.70 119 Madagascar                      Malawi+5                          Chad-8 Mali-4                            
Uganda 28,947 871 769 0.380 30.21 120 Rwanda                          Niger+6      Sierra Leone+7                    Mozambique+3                      
Ukraine 47,105 5520 4366 0.696 38.07 121 Togo                            Mozambique+2                      Ethiopia+4                        Benin-14           
United King. 60,226 33279 29000 0.845 43.31 122 Centr. Afr. R.                  Ethiopia+3                        Burkina Faso-8                    Togo-1                            
United States 296,507 43023 37087 0.895 30.73 123 Mozambique                      Iraq-34                            Mali-8                            Sierra Leone+4                    
Uruguay 3,306 9403 8211 0.733 37.24 124 Malawi                          Sierra Leone+3                    Mozambique-1                      Centr. Afr. R.-2                  
Uzbekistan 26,167 1998 463 0.588 50.07 125 Ethiopia                        Uzbekistan-30                      Niger+1                           Burkina Faso-11                    
Venezuela 26,577 9774 6052 0.666 52.49 126 Niger                           Chad-16                            Burundi+3                         Burundi+3                         
Vietnam 83,105 2100 1610 0.540 66.52 127 Sierra Leone                    Zimbabwe+1                        Congo-D.Rep.+3                    Namibia-58                         
Yemen 21,096 1976 1216 0.403 48.09 128 Zimbabwe                        Congo-35                           Zimbabwe                        Botswana-87      
Zambia 11,478 1089 913 0.360 27.18 129 Burundi                         Burundi                         - Tanzania-17                        
Zimbabwe 13,120 455 387 0.159 16.59 130 Congo-D.Rep.                    Congo-D.Rep.        - Zimbabwe-2                        
All indicators are per capita (except population). In the country rank section, superscript indicates the change in rank order from 
GDP.  
Sources: for population and GDP, World Bank (2013); for GDPe, see the text; for the new HDI, UNDP (2010); for HPI, Abdallah 
et al. (2009).  
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Figure 1. Scatter correlations between GDP, GDPe, new HDI and HPI for 130 countries, 2005 
 
Sources: elaborations from table 1. For each pair, the fit line displayed is the highest one of linear, quadratic, or cubic. 
 
